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Abstract 
We use an original dataset to examine the impact of informal and flexible contractual arrangements on 
wages of a sample of domestic workers hired by private employers in Portugal. All arrangements should 
be formal involving declaration of employment relationship to social security authorities. Our results 
suggest formality benefits workers whether they have stable or flexible contract. However, social and 
labour market processes help shape and maintain inequality, especially for migrant workers. Specific and 
general skills are undervalued and are unable to generate rewards. Compensation was identified for 
contingent work, multiple employers and elderly caregivers but this hides exploitation and insecurity. 
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Introduction 
The Employment Relationship Recommendation (198) (ILO, 2006) and the Decent 
Work Agenda (ILO, 2002; 2010) are illustrations of efforts to guarantee the protection 
of workers’ rights in labour laws and other regulations, including collective agreements. 
These initiatives also strive to bring more hidden types of employment relationship 
under the protection of the law. However, an assessment of the impact of such 
initiatives has not yet been made in the literature. Our article attempts to fill this gap and 
offers empirical evidence on how the compliance with regulations affects the outcomes 
of the labour market of domestic workers in Portugal. 
Domestic work is economically and socially relevant and there has been an 
effort to guarantee protection of these workers’ rights in labour laws and other 
regulations. Portugal is among the European countries that has regulated domestic work 
through specific labour law and entitled domestic workers to the minimum wage. 
Portuguese government has ratified the ILO Convention 189 in 2015, while national 
bodies have taken active steps to develop and disseminate information on legal rights 
and legislations in domestic work in the line with ILO Recommendation 201 (e.g. 
GAMI, 2012). 
Nevertheless, their working conditions are still far from satisfactory. A number 
of questions remain. More specifically, how the characteristics of contractual 
arrangements affect the wages of domestic workers? Does the compliance with labour 
market regulations impact the working conditions, especially the wages of domestic 
workers? Is there a wage gap between formal/informal jobs? Are there differences 
within formal and informal jobs, namely related to flexible arrangements? 
We examine the impact of contractual arrangements on the wages of a sample of 
domestic workers in Portugal (n = 684). Domestic workers are hired by private families 
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through a variety of arrangements. We combine two relevant features of this specific 
labour market, namely, declaration (formality), i.e. the registration of the employment 
relationship to social security authorities vs. no declaration; and job stability vs. 
flexibility.  
In Portugal, hourly and daily payments make flexibility a regular feature of 
contractual arrangements, while the monthly payment system may be used to develop a 
stable (lasting or continuous) relationship. Furthermore, all employers and employees 
are required to declare their employment relationship to social security authorities, i.e. 
should formalise that relationship. This article therefore focuses on four types of 
arrangement: declared and stable, undeclared and stable, declared and flexible, and 
undeclared and flexible. 
Our strategy paralleled that of Mocan and Tekin (2003) and Tansel and Kan 
(2012) which assumed multiple dimensions of contracts. Empirical analysis adopts the 
treatment effect model (Wooldridge, 2010) to deal with imprecise and inconsistent 
estimates arising from the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) earnings model. We assume 
that domestic workers themselves can select, or at least accept, the contractual 
arrangement; therefore, we follow Deb and Trivedi (2006a, 2006b) and use a treatment-
outcome model for the multinomial choice of contractual arrangements. 
It is thus possible to determine whether good (bad) working conditions, proxied 
by the characteristics of contracts, correlate with higher (lower) wages. However, it is 
argued that social and labour market processes have shaped inequality and that wage 
differentials reflect the structural disadvantages in domestic work. Domestic work is a 
female-dominated occupation and this implies lower wages than jobs typically filled by 
men (England, 1992; Perales, 2013). Gender is not, however, the only issue to be 
addressed; the intersectional approach has underlined how race, citizenship, social 
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origin and migration interconnect to reinforce disadvantage (Milkman, Reese and Roth, 
1998). 
We found that the wage setting inside domestic work is far from straightforward. 
Our results show how multiple dimensions, namely economic and social factors, 
intersect and influence wages and ultimately contribute to maintaining poor 
employment conditions in domestic work. 
 
Non-pecuniary characteristics and wage differentials 
It is generally assumed that the regulations for domestic work are different from those 
in other jobs in the economy and that the employment relationship between private 
households and domestic workers is often of an exploitative nature (Meagher, 2002). 
Moreover, domestic workers are usually vulnerable to various types of abuse and are 
engaged in unequal power relationships (Chen, 2011; Meagher, 1997). A brief report by 
the ILO (2011) summarises some relevant hypotheses to explain wage differentials, 
namely undervaluation, pay discrimination, bargaining power, or minimum wage 
legislation and coverage. However, it fails to examine whether wages vary among 
employment relationship models.  
The literature documents the multiple contractual arrangements of domestic 
workers, namely, working for single or multiple employers; on a part-time or full-time 
basis; within an informal or formal situation; and hired for a single or multiple tasks 
(Chen, 2011). However, informality has been the main focus of international bodies 
because it invariably leads to a lack of social protection and other substandard 
employment conditions.  
Available research offers a variety of definitions of the informal economy (see 
Hussmanns, 2004 and Williams, 2014 for a discussion). We suggest domestic work fits 
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into the category of “informal jobs” because of the non-declaration of the jobs or the 
workers (Hussmanns, 2004) or ‘wholly informal waged employment’ defined as an 
employment relationship “wholly unregistered by or hidden from, the state for tax, 
social security and labour law purposes, and can be temporary or permanent and 
relatively low- or high-paid” (Williams, 2014, p. 740). This is not surprising because 
informal salaried workers are usually penalised and represent a disadvantaged segment 
in the labour market (Arias, 2007).  
In contrast, research on the impact of job flexibility on wages shows quite broad 
consensus on compensating wages for flexible arrangements (e.g. Hamersma, Heinrich 
and Mueser, 2014; Graaf-Zijl, 2012; Weeden, 2005). However, flexible arrangements 
have received less attention in the literature on domestic work. 
In light of the reported literature, we expect a variation in wages among 
contractual arrangements in domestic work. It is thus interesting to examine whether 
undeclared and flexible domestic workers suffer a wage penalty in the labour market. 
The studies exploring multiple dimensions of contractual arrangements are 
scarce, however. Tansel and Kan (2012) explored wage differentials in formal/informal 
and wage/self-employment, while Mocan and Tekin (2003) focused on full-time/part-
time employment in the for-profit and non-profit sectors. These strategies have not yet 
been applied in the literature to examine wage differentials in domestic work, 
characterised by informal and flexible contracts. 
Other job characteristics may affect the wages of domestic workers. Research 
suggests that caring occupations generally involve lower pay (e.g. Budig and Misra, 
2010; Razavi and Staab, 2010; Barron and West, 2013), while other studies report a 
wage penalty for some categories within domestic work, namely caregivers and full 
time workers in the US. (e.g. Shierholz, 2013). In other words, domestic workers 
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generally have lower wages, fewer benefits, and less legal or social protection than 
other workers (Shierholz, 2013; Chen, 2011; Tijdens and Van Klaveren, 2011). 
Nevertheless, some segments within domestic work, notably caregivers, are more 
severely penalised. 
There are many reasons for caregivers having lower wages. Razavi and Staab 
(2010) and Budig and Misra (2010) suggest explanations associated with the 
characteristics of job, work, and workers. For example, caring is labour-intensive and 
less likely to accommodate technological innovation; and there is a complex trade-off 
between efficiency and quality of care. Consequently, employers hire workers from 
disadvantaged groups, namely on the basis of gender and race, to contain labour costs 
(Budig and Misra, 2010). 
Literature describes non-economic factors that impact wages in domestic work, 
especially social and labour market processes (England, 1992). Occupational 
segregation by sex is undoubtedly a source of inequality and the literature reveals that 
wages are lower in female-dominated occupations than male jobs (England, 1992). 
Furthermore, rewards in society are gender-driven and a higher value is attached to the 
skills of male-dominated occupations (McGrath and DeFilippis, 2009).  
Scholars raised an important issue in domestic work in this regard because both 
domestic workers and their employers are typically women (Rollins, 1985). They insist 
that the employment is based on an asymmetric relationship, the mistress-maid 
relationship, where often one woman exploits another (Rollins, 1985; Arat-Koc, 1989). 
Paid domestic work has therefore become a space for growing inequality among women 
(Milkman, Reese and Roth, 1998) leading to an ideological distinction between the 
work performed by domestic workers – “woman’s work” – and the so-called “real job” 
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of their employers (McGrath and DeFilippis, 2009). Employers may, therefore, 
undervalue the skills of domestic workers. 
In addition, scholars have highlighted not only that migrants suffer from greater 
disadvantages, but, more importantly, that gender, race, ethnicity and citizenship 
interact in paid domestic work (Glenn, 1992; Romero, 1992; Anderson, 2001). There is 
a link with gender, migration and ethnicity issues that increases the vulnerability of 
domestic workers (Anderson, 1997; Duffy, 2005). 
Some work has been conducted to explore this issue through the concept of the 
double-negative effect (e.g. Shamsuddin, 1998; Piazzalunga, 2015). These studies 
compared wage differentials between native and foreign-born men and women. 
Piazzalunga found sizeable evidence on ethnic-based discrimination for female 
migrants, while the results of Shamsuddin underlined the gender-based discrimination. 
Accordingly, we expect an ethnic wage gap in domestic work. 
Finally, domestic workers' substandard conditions have been severly aggravated 
by their workplace. Working in a private household fosters social isolation, invisibility 
and lack of regulation, making domestic workers even more vulnerable to exploitation 
(Milkman, Reese and Roth, 1998). 
In sum, while there is some consensus among scholars on poor working 
conditions, another stream of literature addresses the particularities of domestic work 
and examines how employers can offer these conditions without endangering their 
home and family members. In addition to performing flexible tasks, such as cleaning 
and housekeeping, which may be performed in anytime, domestic workers also do 
inflexible chores that include caring for children, the elderly and sick or disabled 
people, and cooking, which require a timely performance (De Ruijter and Van der 
Lippe, 2007). Furthermore, caregivers tend to develop personal relationships with their 
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employers (Chen, 2011), which makes them extremely difficult to replace (Anderson, 
2007).  
Trust is also an issue (De Ruijter, van der Lippe, and Raub, 2003) because 
employers entrust their home, family members and often the keys of the house to people 
they scarcely know. As a result, employers often rely on references and 
recommendations from their network of friends, family and neighbours when making 
the decision to hire domestic workers from the informal labour market (Moras, 2008). 
Domestic work is economically and socially relevant (see Abrantes, 2014 for domestic 
workers in Europe) because it enables productive workers, especially women, to have 
their own jobs. Employers may, however, be unaware of the complexity of this work, 
especially when it involves care provision. 
   
Domestic work in Portugal 
Paid domestic work is of the utmost importance in the Portuguese labour market. 
Although Portugal has the highest rate of female employment in Southern European 
countries, the traditional gender culture persists and welfare systems supporting 
women's participation in the labour market are lacking (Tavora and Rubery, 2013). 
Indeed, families in Southern European countries rely almost exclusively on women 
(Bettio and Plantenga, 2004) and foreign workers to assist in the provision of care 
(Simonazzi, 2009). In ‘familial’ models of welfare, families purchase care services 
directly from the market and often employ migrant domestic workers to support their 
elderly members in need of care (Shutes and Chiatti, 2012) and for home-based child-
care (Williams, 2012).  
Female employment patterns and a familial society make Portugal an interesting 
case study to examine the relevance of domestic work performed by both native and 
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migrant women, especially from Portuguese speaking ex-colonies and European 
countries (Abrantes, 2012). Domestic workers have helped women reconcile work and 
family life and to maintain the labour division within families (Crompton, 2006) at a 
low cost (Torres, 2008). They have also been a solution for the care of the elderly and 
disabled at home; in fact, private households are the largest employers of care workers 
in Portugal (Cangiano, 2014). 
Portugal is one of the European countries that have regulated domestic work 
through specific labour law since the 1980s, and domestic workers have been entitled to 
the minimum wage since 1978. The legislation on domestic work in Portugal dates back 
to 1980 but progress was made particularly in the early 1990s. The Decree-law 235/92 
stipulates the working conditions that employers must give workers, namely, the tasks 
to be performed, the pay and pay components including paid holidays and Christmas 
bonus, and other working conditions. According to this Decree-law, employment 
contracts are legally valid even if they are not in writing (Martins, 2009). Formal 
(written) contracts are only obligatory in the case of fixed term contracts and to obtain 
or renew the visas of foreign workers. In all other relationships, domestic workers are 
advised to formalise their contracts in order to enjoy more favourable social protection 
(GAMI, 2012). 
Like other paid workers in Portugal, domestic workers are entitled to the 
national minimum wage, which is set as a monthly-based wage of 485 Euros (in 2012) 
for live-in or full-time workers. Domestic workers have a special contributory scheme 
in Portugal, which attempts to address the specificities of workers and employers (UGT, 
2006) and to avoid very high contributions that probably lower the wage received by 
domestic workers considerably (GAMI, 2012). They can choose between paying social 
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security rates on the basis of either a pre-set wage or the total earned wage (GAMI, 
2012). 
The pre-set wage is defined by the authorities and represents around 70% of the 
national minimum wage. It was €356.34 euro in 2012 for monthly wage earners, €11.88 
for daily, and €2.42 for hourly contracts (GAMI, 2012). This means that irrespective of 
the total wages earned, domestic workers have to pay contributions only on the basis of 
that pre-set wage. However, the social security authorities impose a minimum of 30 
hours of work per month for the pre-set wage system. 
Furthermore, the social security rates levied on a pre-set wage are lower than 
those based on total earnings. The rates for the former are 18.9% for employers and 
9.40% for workers. This compares with 22.3% and 11% respectively when based on 
total earned wages but domestic workers in this system are eligible for unemployment 
insurance schemes. Eligibility for unemployment benefit also requires domestic workers 
to have been in a full-time job with a monthly-based wage. 
Literature fails to explain why workers opt in favour of one system or the other. 
It does indicate, however, that employers often fail to comply with regulations, notably 
non-payment or non-compliance with the requirement to declare the employment 
relationship to social security authorities (Abrantes, 2012). It therefore seems that the 
decision is dictated by the non-wage cost and/or worker's income. 
Social protection was extended to domestic workers in the late 1960s before the 
end of the fascist regime. This sought to ensure that everyone could obtain a pension 
(old-age, disability or widow's) even if they had not made social security contributions. 
Recently, the Portuguese government has ratified the ILO Convention 189 
(Parliament Resolution 42/2015; Decree-law 31/2015). These recommendations are 
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expected to be implemented as national bodies have strived to prepare and disseminate 
information on legal rights and legislation in domestic work (e.g. GAMI, 2012).  
Nevertheless, poor working conditions still prevail in domestic work in Portugal, 
due in part to illegal migration and undeclared work (Pereira, 2013; Reyneri, 2003). 
However, considerable efforts have been made by Portuguese governments to regularise 
undocumented migrants and give them labour rights (see Oliveira, 2013 for details). 
 
The dataset  
The empirical analysis draws on an original cross-sectional dataset of domestic workers 
in Portugal collected in 2010 for an international project (see Guibentif, 2011 for 
details). Given the characteristics of domestic workers and their workplace, snowball 
sampling was used to gain access to participants. The contact details of domestic 
workers were obtained from domestic work unions, immigration-related institutions, 
and personal acquaintances. 
Data on domestic work are scarce and more importantly they lack robust 
statistical check of the estimates (ILO, 2013). We applied an original inquiry to collect 
specific information for the purpose of studying the drivers of wages differentials. 
However, we are aware that our sample is not fully representative of the population of 
domestic workers in Portugal
ii
. In this context, the conclusions drawn for this sample 
cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the entire population. 
The data were gathered in face to face interviews and include information on 
socio-demographic characteristics, demand for skills, wages, contracts, tasks to be 
performed, working hours, formality, and employers’ characteristics (n = 684).  
Though some variables are self-explanatory, others deserve further explanation. 
For example, the tasks performed were collected from a list of 19 items detailing the 
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specific cleaning, cooking, child and elderly care tasks. Domestic workers were recoded 
into three types of job: cleaners, child caregivers, and elderly care workers. However, as 
caregivers also perform non-caring tasks, we labelled workers who perform at least one 
of the caring tasks detailed in the survey as caregivers. 
The skills were assessed through self-perception of relevant skills. The 
questionnaire included the following question: “If you were an employer, which skills 
would you look for in a domestic worker?” It was assumed that the workers would 
mention the skills they considered appropriate to perform household tasks. This might 
proxy the skills required in the domestic work. The survey included further questions 
regarding the skills and abilities of domestic workers. Domestic workers were also 
asked whether their employers demanded specific skills. Moreover, the sampled 
workers were asked whether employers asked for references, how they got the job and 
how work was monitored. Monitoring activities were assessed through the presence 
(absence) of the employer in the workplace during working hours. 
There are no uniform data regarding wages. While some domestic workers refer 
to an hourly wage, others earn on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. In order to achieve a 
standard that facilitates further analysis, hourly wage was computed using data on total 
working days per month and week, and the total working hours per day, reported by the 
domestic workers themselves. Of course, this was not necessary for readily available 
data on hourly wages. 
Live-in workers on call 24 hours a day were the most difficult cases; but it was 
decided to consider at least 7 hours of rest and 17 hours of work per day. On the other 
hand, as some live-in workers reported one day off per week, one day was excluded 
from the total days per week. However, the dataset does not include information on 
public holidays. 
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Where applicable, hourly wage accommodates the value related to Christmas 
and holiday bonuses. The hourly wage was weighted by 1.083 if the worker received 
one bonus and 1.166 if there were two bonuses. More specifically, if the worker was 
paid 13 or 14 monthly wages a year. It should be stressed that some domestic workers 
receiving an hourly-based wage are entitled to bonuses and the weighting was applied in 
the same way in these cases. However, the dataset does not enable us to confirm 
whether the workers who reported receiving holiday allowances actually get paid 
holiday. 
Finally, the net hourly wage was used in regression models. The dataset includes 
declared or formal and undeclared or informal workers. Social security contributions are 
deducted from the wages of declared and formal workers, while the informal workers 
receive the wages reported. For the sake of comparison, we deducted the social 
contributions costs (either based on the pre-set or total earned wage) from the wages of 
declared domestic workers, and this reduced their wages by 10%. 
Primarily, we used a principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce the 14 skills 
and abilities variables, measured by self-perception of required skills, to a smaller and 
more manageable number of components that explains a large proportion of the 
variance. The following categories of skills are grouped through PCA: personal traits, 
specific skills, flexibility and general skills (see Table A2 for details in Appendix 2).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of variables, detailed in Table A1, used to 
estimate the determinants of wages in the labour market of domestic workers. It should 
be stressed that domestic work is almost exclusively a female occupation (99.6% of the 
sample) in Portugal. 
 
Table 1 
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At the outset, descriptive statistics suggested variations in the wages of workers 
with different contractual arrangements. The figures displayed in Table 1 indicate that 
workers with multiple employers tend to earn higher wages than those on single-
employer contracts. The estimates point to wage differentials among stable and flexible 
workers; and between declared and undeclared. We notice that undeclared workers have 
lower wages. Furthermore, the evidence reported in Table 2 confirmed additional 
benefits of being engaged in declared work. 
 
Table 2 
 
It can be observed that undeclared workers experience less favourable treatment 
in both situations. The pay package of declared and stable workers seems to be closer to 
the package of other employees in the economy, while occasional workers benefit from 
being declared. 
 
The methodology and econometric model 
The variables 
To test the impact of the proposed measures of contractual arrangements, this section 
describes the econometric model to estimate the wage differentials between four types 
of contractual arrangement that combine coverage by social security and stability: 
declared and stable; undeclared and stable; declared and flexible; and undeclared and 
flexible domestic workers. While declared work presupposes registration with social 
security authorities and the payment of the respective contributions, the stability 
(flexibility) of the relationship is measured through the payment system, i.e. by a 
monthly (hourly or daily) based system. From our day-to-day experience, households 
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try to develop lasting or continuing relationships by paying wages on a monthly rather 
than hourly or daily basis in the case of both full-time and part-time workers. This 
generally fosters a long term relationship between households and domestic workers 
with single or multiple employers. Benefits associated with declared work reinforces the 
impact of labour market regulations by reducing inequalities and points to the 
segmentation hypothesis. Therefore, informal workers are a disadvantaged group in the 
labour market. In contrast, if the labour market enables undeclared workers to have 
positive wage differentials, it suggests that informality is compensated by higher wages. 
The predictions of compensating wage differentials are fully confirmed by the higher 
wages of undeclared and flexible arrangements. 
In addition, the model included a set of control variables for socioeconomic 
characteristics like age; origin (particularly relevant in a market with so many migrants); 
job status (to control for single or multiple employers); network to obtain a job and 
recommendation of the candidate associated with trust-related issues; job requirements 
(the skills required to perform household tasks); and occupational structure to explore 
the role of caring tasks and household characteristics related to the type of workplace 
(see Table A1 in Appendix 1 for the description of variables). 
 
Econometric model 
Firstly, we use an OLS regression model to explore the drivers of wages in domestic 
work, in which the dependent variable was the hourly wage in logarithm form. 
However, the possibility of inconsistent estimators due to endogenous selection bias 
associated with the choice of contractual arrangement is a major problem in this 
estimation. Any worker in the economy may voluntarily choose (or at least accept) 
informal jobs when entering the labour market either out of personal preference or 
because he/she has no alternative due to the scarcity of formal work (Maloney and 
16 
 
 
 
Arias, 2007). Endogenous selection in domestic work might arise because not all of 
them know as much about their legal rights and the benefits of doing a regulated work. 
Domestic workers are dubious about the benefits or protection of formality within an 
invisible activity performed in private households where compliance with labour laws is 
not monitored (Chen, 2011). Therefore, those aware of rights and benefits prefer formal 
arrangements, while others may choose informality. This has an impact on the choice 
(or acceptance) and makes domestic workers select contractual arrangements 
accordingly. Furthermore, national bodies seek to increase and broaden the access of 
domestic workers, and especially migrants, to their legal rights by publicising 
information about the relevant laws and labour rights in Portugal (GAMI, 2012). 
Following Deb and Trivedi (2006a, 2006b), we examine the impact of the four 
types of contractual arrangement on wages by using a treatment-outcome model for the 
multinomial choice of contractual arrangements. The treatment effects approach is 
suitable for dealing with endogenous selection as in the case of contractual 
arrangements in our wage determinants model (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Maddala, 
1983). Neglecting selection leads to correlation of the error terms and consequently to 
an omitted variable bias. 
However, multiple arrangements (as opposed to binary) call for the multinomial 
choice model (Deb and Trivedi, 2006b), which is in fact an extension of the treatment 
model applied to multinomial choice. The model assumes the joint distribution of 
endogenous treatment and wages using a latent factor structure and applies a maximum 
simulated likelihood approach for estimation. These econometric solutions are captured 
in mtreatreg Stata command and presuppose a model with two sets of equations: the 
selection and the outcome equations. 
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The determinants of contractual arrangements include the above-mentioned 
socioeconomic variables that influence wages and an additional instrument to illustrate 
domestic workers’ knowledge of legal rights and benefits. We are interested in 
examining the role of workers in the enforcement process. Marinakis (2016) suggests 
that employers often fail to comply with regulations and reports institutional factors that 
ensure compliance with regulations, notably in the case of minimum wage. Rani et al 
(2013) add the role of workers and consider that domestic workers should help ensure 
regulations are enforced by reporting violations and claims.  
In our survey, the domestic workers were asked “if needed, would you be willing 
to use courts to appeal against any failures to comply with contractual obligations?” 
Rani et al (2013) underline that the lack of suitable data makes it difficult to assess 
compliance based on the number of complaints reported by workers to enforcement 
bodies or to courts. Furthermore, the “quasi-familial” relationship with employers 
(Romero, 1992) deters domestic workers from seeking compliance through the courts or 
other bodies.  
Nevertheless, we presuppose that affirmative answers to that question indicate 
that domestic workers at least know their rights and this can help them push for 
compliance. The knowledge of the rights is therefore the first necessary pre-requisite for 
enforcement, though obviously insufficient in itself. As national bodies take 
considerable efforts to inform domestic workers about their legal rights (GAMI, 2012), 
informed workers are more likely to choose legal and stable employment relationships, 
while ill-informed workers may select occasional and informal work. 
As regards the econometric model, it should be stressed that the matrix of 
covariates zi  does not necessarily require additional variables relative to xi to be 
identified. However, we decided to have an exclusion restriction or instrument, the 
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“knowledge of legal rights” in the treatment equation, as suggested by Deb and Trivedi 
(2006a). Therefore, latent factors enter the outcome and treatments equations in the 
same way as observed covariates and incorporate unobserved characteristics related to 
the knowledge of legal rights. On the other hand, since latent factors enter the likelihood 
function but are unknown, the maximisation of the likelihood function is performed 
through simulation by drawing several random numbers from a standard normal 
distribution. 
A formal representation of the model is given for the choice of contractual 
arrangement, where each individual i chooses a type of contractual arrangement j from a 
set of four choices (𝑗 = 0,1,2,3) where 𝑗 = 0 is the control group (undeclared and 
flexible). Let  𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗  denote the utility associated with the hourly wage of individual i 
with contractual arrangement j  
𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 
where 𝑧𝑖 denotes a set of exogenous covariates with parameters 𝛼𝑗 , 𝜂𝑖𝑗  are i.i.d. error 
terms, and lij are latent factors which incorporate unobserved characteristics common to 
the individual i ’s status choice and outcome (logarithm of hourly wage). The 𝑙𝑖𝑗  are 
assumed to be independent of 𝜂𝑖𝑗 . As a normalisation 𝐸𝑉𝑖0
∗ = 0, so the expected utility 
of j-th status is the differential utility relative to that undeclared and flexible 
arrangement. 
Let 𝑑𝑖 be binary selection variables representing the observed contractual 
arrangement choice and 𝒅𝑖 = (𝑑𝑖1, 𝑑𝑖2, 𝑑𝑖3). Also let 𝒍𝑖 = (𝑙𝑖1, 𝑙𝑖2, 𝑙𝑖3). The mixed 
multinomial logit structure for the probability of contractual arrangement choice can 
then be represented as   
                                                𝑃(𝐝𝑖|𝐳𝑖 , 𝐥𝑖) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(z𝑖
′𝛼𝑗+𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑗)
1+∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐳𝑖
′𝛼𝑘+𝛿𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑘)
𝐽
𝑘=1
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The expected outcome equation for individual i is formulated as 
 
                                  𝐸(𝑦𝑖) = 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑗
3
𝑗=1  
 
where xi is a set of exogenous variables and γj denote the treatment effects relative to 
the undeclared and flexible arrangement. The expected value of the log hourly wage, 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖), is a function of the latent factors lij so that it is affected by unobserved 
characteristics which also affect the selection a contractual arrangement. The 
interpretation of the λj factor-loading parameters is as follows: when λj is positive 
(negative), unobserved factors which increase the probability of selecting j-th 
contractual arrangement also increase (reduce) the hourly wage. 
In order to estimate parameters of the model, latent factors are assumed to be 
i.i.d. Draws from the standard normal distribution and simulation-based method are 
used to maximise the log likelihood. Provided the number of draws is sufficiently large 
(we select 350 draws), maximisation of the simulated log likelihood is equivalent to 
maximising the log likelihood. Parameters of this model are identified when zi = xi , 
but Deb and Trivedi (2006b) recommend including some variables in zi which are not 
included in xi  . 
 
The impact of economic and non-economic factors on wages 
The estimates from the OLS regression model displayed in Table 3
iii
 indicate that stable 
contracts imply that domestic workers experience a non-negligible wage penalisation. 
The difference is even greater for undeclared workers in stable contracts. 
 
Table 3 
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Table 4 displays the estimates of the treatment-outcome model for multinomial 
choice to control for endogenous selection bias. The results show that the estimates 
from OLS and the treatment model vary considerably.  The corrected estimates from the 
treatment model reported in columns 5 show some marked differences, especially in 
relation to the impact of contractual arrangements. Furthermore, the lambda (λ), which 
measures the impact of selection, is statistically significant for the three arrangements, 
indicating that our prediction of endogenous selection was correct. The OLS estimates 
are therefore biased and the analysis should proceed on the basis of the treatment 
approach estimates. Moreover, the test of degree of substitutability between contractual 
arrangements demonstrated the non-violation of the IIA assumption. 
 
Table 4 
 
The evidence from the selection equation in Table 4 presents positive and 
significant signs of unobserved workers’ characteristics proxied by the knowledge of 
legal rights and benefits in the declared arrangements. Domestic workers with that 
knowledge are 4.2(e1.430) times more likely to have declared and stable contracts, and 
3.6(e1.268) times more likely to have declared but flexible arrangements. Self-selection 
does in fact occur and domestic workers choose an efficient arrangement.  
Socioeconomic features are also relevant predictors of contractual arrangements. 
For example, the tasks to be performed and the skills required by households have a 
positive and significant impact on declared and stable contracts. Working for multiple 
employers increases the probability of being engaged in flexible arrangements and at the 
same time decreases the likelihood of stable contracts in declared work. In addition, the 
estimates suggest that workplace characteristics have an impact on contractual 
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arrangements. Employers living in houses are more likely to offer declared and stable 
jobs than those living in flats. 
The findings from the equation of interest, the outcome equation, are consistent 
with wage differentials among the range of contractual arrangements Workers in 
declared and stable arrangements have a wage penalisation of almost 4.2% compared to 
the counterfactual group in undeclared and flexible domestic work, while workers in 
stable and undeclared workers suffer a penalisation of about 24.5%. Additionally, 
contingent workers, those paid on an hourly or daily basis, tend to have a high hourly 
wage and it is higher for declared work. Finally, working for multiple employers 
increases the hourly wage by 18.3%. Workers in caring jobs experience either a wage 
benefit (elderly caregivers) or penalty (child care workers), when compared to cleaning 
jobs. 
There is an interesting finding regarding the skills required to perform household 
tasks. General and specific skills are drivers of earnings in domestic work, but negative 
and significant signs of the estimates are puzzling. The same holds for the negative sign 
associated with the requirement of particular skills. The trust-related estimate suggests 
that employers pay higher wages to domestic workers recommended by friends than to 
those hired from agencies or recommended by other networks. There is also a wage 
differential between migrants and native workers. A migrant worker suffers a wage 
penalisation of almost 10%. Finally, employers living in houses tend to pay lower 
wages than those living in flats, but are willing to pay higher wages to those caring for 
the elderly. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
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The marketisation of domestic work, and care work in particular, has received wide 
attention because it crosses several social, economic and political issues, notably 
patterns of women’s employment, female migration, informality and shadow economy, 
regulations and working conditions of domestic workers. However, the employment 
relationship that supports that commodification deserves further inquiry. 
Our study focused on the employment of domestic workers in private 
households and examined how the compliance with regulations affects labour market 
outcomes. More especially, we attempted to explore how the wages of domestic 
workers vary across contractual arrangements, which are regulated by a specific labour 
law in Portugal. It should be noted that declaration to social security authority is 
compulsory; so, domestic workers should always be engaged in a formal or declared 
employment relationship whether they have a flexible or stable work situation. 
The contractual arrangements in domestic work in Portugal are heterogeneous 
and parallel the typology proposed by Chen (2011). Domestic workers may work for 
one or a set of employers; in a full-time or part-time job; be engaged in declared or 
undeclared relationships; earn on a monthly, hourly or daily basis; and live in the 
employer’s house or are external workers. These different arrangements have a 
considerable impact on the wages earned by domestic workers.   
The wage penalisation of workers in stable jobs corroborates the findings of 
Shierholz (2013) because full-time workers receive lower wages in the labour market of 
domestic workers. However, declared work is less penalised than undeclared work, and 
declared flexible contracts have greater benefits than flexible and undeclared work. 
Declaration brings additional monetary benefits. The data provided confirms that 
a larger proportion of workers in declared work receive Christmas and holiday bonuses, 
health insurance or food allowances than those in informal employment relationships 
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(Table 2). The exploitation of informal workers is thus clear; undeclared work is a 
secondary segment in this labour market. 
Domestic workers who work for multiple employers are given higher wages to 
compensate for the time spent going from household to household, i.e. the non-
productive hours. Nevertheless, these figures hide a much more worrying situation. 
Contingent work involves substantial insecurity with no guarantee of regular contracted 
hours and, consequently, a stable income.  
Caregivers working with the elderly are probably also compensated for both the 
range of services provided to foster wellbeing, dignity and autonomy and also for being 
available at all times. This finding contradicts somehow the wage penalty of caring 
occupations reported in the literature (Razavi ans Staab, 2010; Budig and Misra, 2010). 
However, the residential care is extremely demanding and it is often based on the 
expectation that domestic workers should be available to assist the elderly at any time. 
Excessive working hours and often poor accommodation could cancel out the wage 
benefits of elderly caregivers. 
On the other hand, caring for children implies a wage penalty in Portugal. This 
finding is consistent with previous literature, which points to segmentation that divides 
high-pay and low-pay in caring occupations (Barron and West, 2013). This kind of 
segmentation within caring jobs in domestic work deserves further scrutiny but suggests 
that the employer, probably the recipient of care, is able (and willing) to pay higher 
wages than the parents of children.  
However, this is an incomplete picture of the wage setting in domestic work. 
While migration has contributed to the supply of labour for caring and cleaning tasks 
that enables women to go out to work (Anderson, 2007; Bettio, Simmonazi and Villa, 
2006), wage differentials between native and non-native workers corroborate claims of 
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the greater vulnerability of migrant domestic workers. This supports empirical evidence 
of an ethnic wage gap, i.e. female migrants are at a greater disadvantage than native 
female domestic workers (Shamsuddin, 1998; Piazzalunga, 2015).  
Society tends to undervalue domestic work and to see it as women's work. 
Households are unwilling to reward the skills of those who care for their home, children 
and elderly family members because, ultimately, they do not consider domestic work a 
“real job”. 
However, estimates from the selection equation suggest that the probability of a 
stable and formal contract increased when skills were required. Employers seem to 
protect their investment by searching for suitable skills but might also be aware of the 
affective relationships and trust issues that domestic work involves. In sum, employers 
are not keen to pay for skills but seem to be aware of the risk of substituting the 
domestic worker (Anderson, 2007).  
Our study reveals that domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation and to bad working conditions; this is in large part because it is done by 
women and migrants whose skills are undervalued. Thus, economic, social and labour 
market processes contribute decisively to maintaining and increasing disadvantages. 
However, the available research on the undervaluation of women’s work has been 
limited to examining the inequality caused by skills in the labour market. 
Despite our interesting empirical evidence, all results must be regarded with 
caution. As the sample is small and based on snowball sampling, it is neither random 
nor fully representative. In fact, it is extremely complicated to create a random and 
representative dataset due to the size and dispersed nature of the universe. 
Our findings suggest that compliance with regulatory standards lead to better 
labour market outcomes for domestic workers. However, domestic workers should 
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assume their responsibility in the enforcement process; the first step to improve full 
access to rights is thus to inform workers of these legal rights.  
However, the non-wage costs associated with formal employment relationships 
may be considerable for some employers and workers, thus lowering the incentive to 
comply with labour laws. Additionally, the workplace hampers the work of labour 
inspectors, which is an advantage to illegal workers in particular who prefer to remain 
invisible.  
The formalisation discussion is summed up by two questions: i) Are employers, 
and especially middle class women who can only participate in the labour market if they 
employ domestic workers, able to bear the costs of formalisation? ii) How can domestic 
workers stand up for their rights if they stay in informal jobs? Government enforcement 
policies and the willingness of employers and workers to comply with regulations may 
be affected by the particularities of this market. Indeed, domestic work raises a 
compliance puzzle that must be solved. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics [mean, (SD)] 
 
 Sample Declared 
and 
stable 
Undeclared 
and stable 
Declared and 
flexible 
Undeclared 
and flexible 
Hourly wage (ln [euro]) 1.474 
[4.37] 
(0.454) 
1.309 
[3.70] 
(0.465) 
1.301 
[3.67] 
(0.490) 
1.681 
[5.37] 
(0.344) 
1.678 
[5.35] 
(0.320) 
      
Multiple employer 
(Yes = 1) 
0.573 
(0.495) 
0.460 
(0.499) 
0.455 
(0.502) 
0.760 
(0.429) 
0.636 
(0.483) 
      
Network to obtain job: 
relatives (Yes = 1) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
0.184 
(0.389) 
0.209 
(0.410) 
0.211 
(0.409) 
0.135 
(0.343) 
      
Network to obtain job: 
friends (Yes = 1) 
0.602 
(0.490) 
0.561 
(0.498) 
0.455 
(0.502) 
0.618 
(0.487) 
0.685 
(0.467) 
      
Network to obtain job: 
others (Yes = 1) 
0.213 
(0.410) 
0.255 
(0.437) 
0.209 
(0.41) 
0.171 
(0.378) 
0.180 
(0.386) 
      
Employer required 
particular skills (Yes = 1) 
0.282 
(0.451) 
0.376 
(0.485) 
0.246 
(0.434) 
0.235 
(0.425) 
0.153 
(0.362) 
      
Personal traits 
(PCA scores) 
-0.004 
(1.005) 
0.034 
(0.931) 
-0.018 
(1.030) 
-0.074 
(1.070) 
0.015 
(1.066) 
      
Specific skills 
(PCA scores) 
0.000 
(0.994) 
0.156 
(0.957) 
0.089 
(1.008) 
-0.175 
(0.988) 
-0.175 
(1.022) 
      
General skills 
(PCA scores)  
-0.012 
(0.995) 
0.200 
(1.061) 
-0.340 
(0.769) 
-0.141 
(0.946) 
-0.122 
(0.934) 
      
Elderly care tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.172 
(0.378) 
0.250 
(0.434) 
0.130 
(0.339) 
0.118 
(0.324) 
0.09 
(0.288) 
      
Child care tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.218 
(0.413) 
0.242 
(0.429) 
0.333 
(0.475) 
0.164 
(0.372) 
0.162 
(0.370) 
      
Cleaning tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.611 
(0.488) 
0.508 
(0.501) 
0.536 
(0.502) 
0.717 
(0.452) 
0.748 
(0.436) 
      
Age (years) 43.104 
(11.722) 
43.518 
(10.772) 
45.309 
(14.367) 
41.47 
(11.562) 
43.036 
(12.087) 
      
Origin 
(Migrant = 1) 
0.332 
(0.471) 
0.357 
(0.480) 
0.275 
(0.45) 
0.329 
(0.471) 
0.315 
(0.467) 
      
Living in a house 
(Yes = 1) 
0.371 
(0.484) 
0.427 
(0.496) 
0.382 
(0.490) 
0.333 
(0.473) 
0.288 
(0.455) 
      
N 588 256 69 152 111 
 
  
32 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Pay package by contractual arrangements (%) 
Pay components Declared and 
Stable 
Undeclared 
and Stable 
Declared and 
Flexible 
Undeclared and 
Flexible 
Christmas bonus 80.5 53.6 51.0 28.8 
Holiday allowances 77.3 44.9 52.3 18.9 
Health insurance 30.2 7.4 13.4 3.6 
Food allowance  21.2 10.4 12.2 3.6 
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TABLE 3 
Economic returns to contractual arrangements  
in domestic work: OLS estimates 
Model Estimates  
Contractual arrangements
 (a)
 
 
Declared and stable (Yes = 1) -0.267*** 
(0.046) 
Undeclared and stable (Yes = 1) -0.350*** 
(0.0.61) 
Declared and flexible (Yes = 1) -0.002 
(0.043) 
Multiple employer (Yes = 1) 0.135*** 
(0.036) 
Network
(b)
  
Relatives (Yes = 1) -0.009 
(0.045) 
Other network (Yes = 1) -0.087* 
(0.046) 
Demand for particular skills (Yes = 1) -0.114*** 
(0.039) 
Self-perception of relevant skills  
Personal traits (PCA scores) -0.0003 
(0.984) 
Specific skills (PCA scores) 0.036** 
(0.018) 
General skills (PCA scores) -0.052*** 
(0.017) 
Occupational structure
 (c)
 
 
Elderly care tasks (Yes = 1) 0.021 
(0.051) 
Child care tasks (Yes = 1) -0.011 
(0.043) 
Age (years) 0.0004 
(0.787) 
Origin (Migrant = 1) -0.050 
(0.191) 
Living in a house (Yes = 1) -0.010*** 
(0.038) 
Constant 1.638*** 
(0.082) 
N  557 
R
2
 0.253 
Standard errors in brackets; Reference categories: (a)Undeclared and 
flexible; (b)Friends; (c)Cleaning tasks. (*) p < 0.10; (**) p< 0.05; and (***) 
p< 0.01. 
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TABLE 4 
Economic returns to contractual arrangements in domestic work: 
Endogenous multinomial treatment effect estimates 
 
Declared and 
stable 
Undeclared and 
stable 
Declared and 
flexible 
ln (hourly 
wage) 
Multiple employer (Yes=1) -0.617** 
(0.284) 
-0.736** 
(0.373) 
0.756** 
(0.317) 
0.183*** 
(0.009) 
Network
a
     
Relatives (Yes=1) 0.560 
(0.391) 
0.363 
(0.495) 
0.580 
(0.400) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
Other network (Yes=1) 0.657* 
(0.372) 
0.398 
(0.496) 
0.184 
(0.392) 
-0.095*** 
(0.014) 
Particular skills required (Yes = 1) 0.860** 
(0.339) 
0.501 
(0.433) 
0.496 
(0.377) 
-0.082*** 
(0.016) 
Self-perception of relevant skills     
Personal traits (PCA scores) 0.014 
(0.142) 
-0.063 
(0.188) 
-0.126 
(0.150) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Specific skills (PCA scores) 0.323** 
(0.139) 
0.135 
(0.205) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
General skills (PCA scores) 0.318** 
(0.146) 
-0.382* 
(0.200) 
-0.048 
(0.317) 
-0.043*** 
(0.002) 
Occupational structure
(b)
 
 
   
Elderly care tasks (Yes=1) 1.512*** 
(0.408) 
0.819 
(0.588) 
0.198 
(0.461) 
0.095*** 
(0.008) 
Child care tasks (Yes=1) 0.972*** 
(0.373) 
1.133** 
(0.446) 
0.227 
(0.391) 
-0.071*** 
(0.016) 
Age (years) 0.004 
(0.766) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
Origin (Migrant =1) 0.345 
(0.303) 
-0.052 
(0.420) 
0.237 
(0.308) 
-0.090*** 
(0.010) 
Living in a house (Yes=1) 0.625** 
(0.295) 
0.589 
(0.389) 
0.191 
(0.317) 
-0.084*** 
(0.008) 
Knowledge of legal rights (Yes=1) 1.430*** 
(0.282) 
0.183 
(o.374) 
1.268*** 
(0.291) 
 
 Constant -1.183* 
(0.688) 
-1.842** 
(0.934) 
-1.250* 
(0.687) 
1.557*** 
(0.018) 
     
Contractual Arrangements
(c)
  
 
   
Declared and stable (Yes=1) 
 
  -0.042*** 
(0.013) 
Undeclared and stable (Yes=1) 
 
  -0.245*** 
(0.017) 
Declared and flexible (Yes=1) 
 
  0.215*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
   
 λ  (Declared and stable) 
 
  -0.273*** 
(0.004) 
 λ  (Undeclared and stable) 
 
  0.071*** 
(0.004) 
 λ  (Declared and flexible) 
 
  -0.300*** 
0.003) 
Observations 545 
Standard errors in brackets; Reference categories: (a)friends; (b)cleaning tasks; (c)undeclared 
and flexible. (*) p < 0.10; (**) p< 0.05; and (***) p< 0.01. 
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Appendix 1: Table A1 Description of the variables in the model 
 
Variable Definition of the variable 
Dependent variable  
Hourly wage Natural logarithm of hourly net 
wage: reported wage minus 10% for 
declared workers (Euro) 
Explanatory variables  
Contractual arrangements  
Declared and stable 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Undeclared and stable 
Declared and flexible 
Undeclared and flexible 
Job status  
Multiple employer 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Trust issues 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Network to obtain job: relatives 
Network to obtain job: friends 
Network to obtain job: others 
Specific skill requirements  
Employer required particular skills 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Self-perception of relevant skills 
PCA analysis scores 
Personal traits  
Specific skills 
General skills  
Occupational structure  
Elderly care tasks 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise Child care tasks 
Cleaning tasks 
Workers’ characteristics   
Age Age reported (years) 
Origin 1 if Migrants; 0 Native 
Employers’ characteristics 1 if living in a house; 0 apartment 
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Appendix 2: Table A2 The self-perception of relevant skills through principal 
component analysis 
 
Table A2 displays the estimated factors, and indicates that four factors with eigenvalue 
greater than one explain 53.49% of the variance of skills. The value of the KMO test 
(0.811) reveals a good adequacy of the sample. 
 
PCA factors: Explained variance 
(Cronbach Alpha) 
Skills and abilities 
Factor 1: Personal traits Personal service (dealing with people) 
26.6% (0.695) Problem solving 
 Discretion 
 Humility 
 Work satisfaction 
Factor 2: Specific skills Care experience 
9.6% (0.686) Active listening 
 Counseling 
Factor 3: Flexibility Ability to adapt 
9.3% (0.381) Work autonomy 
 Rapidity 
Factor 4: General skills General experience 
7.95% (0.526) Availability 
 Training 
 
On further analysis of the main components, we find that the abilities labeled as 
“personal traits” explain 26.6% of the variability of data including traits like humility, 
discretion, and work satisfaction. Two other components (2 and 4) show the relevance 
of general and specific experience. Finally, the third component brings together the 
skills related to autonomy in work and ability to adapt. Table 6 also presents the 
Cronbach alpha in parentheses after the proportion of explained variance. The estimates 
reported for skill and ability subsets range between 0.381 and 0.695. Given the very low 
internal consistency of the factor labeled “flexibility”, we decided to exclude it from 
further analyses. 
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Appendix 3: Table A3 Correlation matrix 
Variable  
Hourly 
Wage 
Multiple 
employer
s 
Network: 
relatives 
Network: 
others 
Requirem
ents 
Personal 
traits 
Specific 
skills 
General 
skills 
Elderly  
care tasks 
Child 
care tasks 
Age Origin 
 Living in 
a house 
Knowledge 
of 
legal rights 
Declared  
and stable 
Undeclared 
and 
stable 
 
Declared  
and 
flexible 
 
Hourly 
Wage  
1.00                 
Multiple 
employe 
0.28*** 1.00                
Network: 
Relatives 
-0.00 -0.02 1.00               
Network: 
Others 
-0.13*** -0.04 -0.25*** 1.00              
Requirements -0.22*** -0.17*** 0.08** 0.07 1.00             
Personal traits -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.00 1.00            
Specific skills -0.16*** -0.09** -0.02 0.10** 0.08* 0.00 1.00           
General skills -0.16*** -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.00 -0.00 1.00          
Elderly  care 
tasks 
-0.09** -0.05 -0.01 0.08** 0.09** 0.02 0.12*** 0.10** 1.00         
Child care 
tasks 
-0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.24*** 1.00        
Age -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.09** 0.10** 0.02 1.00       
Origin -0.07 -0.01 -0.13*** 0.12** -0.00 -0.10** 0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.08* -0.30*** 1.00      
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Living in a 
house 
-0.17*** -0.10** -0.02 -0.01 0.08* 0.09** 0.01 0.08* -0.07* 0.06 0.16*** -0.09** 1.00     
Knowledge of  
legal rights 
0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.09** -0.01 0.04 1.00    
Declared  and 
stable 
-0.32*** -0.20*** -0.00 0.09** 0.19*** 0.03 0.14 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10** 0.16*** 1.00   
Undeclared and  
stable 
-0.14** -0.09** 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.12** -0.04 0.10** 0.07* -0.04 0.01 -0.08** -0.32*** 1.00  
Declared  and 
flexible 
 
0.27*** 0.23*** 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.10** -0.08* -0.08** -0.08 -0.08** -0.00 -0.05 0.07* -0.52*** -0.22*** 1.00 
(*) p < 0.10; (**) p< 0.05; and (***) p< 0.01. 
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i
  We learned that the variables relevant for our study are often missing in the secondary data available 
for research (e.g. Labour Force Survey, LFS, EUROSTAT). This leads to the neglect of several important 
issues related to domestic work, notably the informality. Furthermore, we are interested in testing the 
argument of the value of skills in the labour market (Green, 1998). However, the available economic 
literature has overlooked the workers and occupations viewed as “non-skilled”. 
ii Relative to LFS, workers from the largest city (Lisbon) and migrants are overrepresented in our 
dataset. 
iii We checked for correlation among variables and excluded some from the model. For example, 
multiple employer condition is negatively correlated with live-in status. A live-in domestic worker is 
unable to work for more than one employer. See the correlation matrix in Table A3 in Appendix 3 for all 
other variables. 
 
 
